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RACIAL INTEGRATION AS A
COMPELLING INTEREST
Elizabeth S. Anderson 1
The premise of this symposium is that the principle and
ideal developed in Brown v. Board of Education 2 and its successor cases lie at the heart of the rationale for affirmative action in
higher education. The principle of the school desegregation
cases is that racial segregation is an injustice that demands
remediation. The ideal of the school desegregation cases is that
racial integration is a positive good, without which "the dream of
one Nation, indivisible" 3 cannot be realized. Both the principle
and the ideal make racial integration a compelling interest. The
Supreme Court recognized these claims in Grutter v. Bollinger.
However, it failed to take full advantage of them. It thereby
failed to answer crucial questions that must be answered by policies subject to strict scrutiny. In this essay, I shall display the
links tying Grutter to Brown, discuss the vulnerabilities of Grutter in the absence of an explicit grounding in Brown, and demonstrate how the affirmative action policy upheld in Grutter, when
explicitly grounded in Brown, survives strict scrutiny. To understand this argument, it is helpful first to explain the integrationist
perspective that underlies it.
I. THE CONTINUING CAUSES OF BLACK

DISADVANTAGE
The integrationist perspective begins with a diagnosis of the
causal mechanisms that continue to systematically disadvantage
blacks. 4 Sixty years after Brown declared state-sponsored racial
1. Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. I thank Rick Hills and kiT Jones for helpful advice.
2. 347U.S.483(1954).
3. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
4. Blacks arc the main focus of race-based affirmative action programs and of
most research into the causes of race-based disadvantage. I therefore focus on their situation. Other groups may be proper targets of affirmative action if they suffer disadvantages analogous to those affecting blacks, or if they suffer from other disadvantages that
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segregation unconstitutional, and fifty years after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 banned racial discrimination in employment,
blacks remain_ seriously disadvantaged on nearly every measure
of well-being.' Given that discrimination and overt hostility toward blacks have declined since these landmark legal events,
what continues to keep blacks back? Two stubborn legacies of
white supremacy play pivotal roles in sustaining black disadvantage: segregation and racial stigma.
Residential segregation is the norm for blacks of all socioeconomic classes in the United States. 6 Segregation of neighborhoods leads to segre~ation of public schools-levels of which increased in the 1990s. Jobs, too, tend to be racially segregated. 8
Black segregation from the mainstream has profound socioeconomic consequences. It isolates blacks from the predominantly
white informal social networks that govern access to economic
opportunities. It confines blacks to regions experiencing severe
job decline, without adequate means of transportation to the
white suburbs where jobs are being created. 9 It deprives blacks
of investment opportunities, because their homes do not appreciate in value as white suburban homes do. 10 Lack of housing
appreciation, in turn, undermines their access to the credit
needed to start businesses. 11 Segregation multiplies and spreads
affirmative action can n;medy.
5. See Council of Economic Advisors for the President's Initiative on Race,
Changing America: lndicawrs of Social and Economic Well-Being by Race and Hispanic
Origin, 1998, http://www.access.gpo.gov/eop/calpdfs/ca.pdf for representative statistics.
6. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 64 tbl. 3.1 (1993). Although based on
1980 Census figures, this remains the definitive work on black residential segregation in
the U.S. That segregation has declined only modestly in Census 2000 is confirmed by
Lewis Mumford Center, Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind
1-2, 5 (Dec. 18, 2<Xll ), http://mumfordl.dyndns.org/ccn2(XJO/WholePop/WPreport/page 1.
html.
7. Gary Orfidd & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare?
18-19 (Jan. 2(X)4) http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/bruwn50.pdf.
8. TIMOTHY BATES, BANKING ON BLACK ENTERPRISE: THE POTENTIAL OF
EMERGING FIRMS FOR REVITALIZING URBAN ECONOMIES 140 (1993) (documenting high
bctwcen-lirm segregation related to race of lirm owner); DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY,
GENDER AND RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOB
SEGREGATION 24 (1993) (documenting high within-lirm segregation).
9. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Michael A. Stollet al., Within Cities and
Suburbs: Racial Residential Concemration and the Spatial Distribution of Employment
Opportunities Across Sub-Metropolitan Areas, 19 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 207
(2()(Xl).
10. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 150-1 (1995).
11. THOMAS D. BOSTON, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BLACK ENTREPRENEURSHIP
76-79 (1999).
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the effects of employment discrimination, by filling blacks' social
networks with people who have been similarly shut out of job
opportunities. It concentrates and thereby multiplies poverty,
exclusion, and disadvantage. Concentrated disadvantage reduces
the tax base while increasing the demands on public services in
cities where blacks live, resulting in higher tax burdens for
poorer services-especially, worse schools-than what whites
enjoy. 12 Segregation also impedes the formation of cross-racial
political coalitions, by ensuring that public services devoted to
black areas will have no spillover benefits for other groups. 13
These consequences of de facto segregation affect middle class
as well as poor blacks. 14
A second broad cause of continuing black disadvantage is
racial stigma- habits of racial classification, perception generalization, and interpretation, and modes of identification that mark
blacks as unworthy, undeserving, pathological, and alien-not
fully "us. " 15 Slavery constituted blacks as a dishonored race; Jim
Crow branded them as an untouchable caste. Although the overt
hostility of such "old-fashioned" racism has waned, it has left
behind subtler forms of systematic bias against blacks, residing
more in cognitive than affective mechanisms, more unconscious
than willingly avowed as such. 16 Pervasive sti9matization of
blacks has been documented in survey research, 1 psychological
experiments, 18 and content analyses of the media. 19
12. See Thomas J. Phelan & Mark Schneider, Race, Ethnicity, and Class in American Suburbs, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 659, 673 (1996) (calculating that, controlling for differences in afllucncc, "black/multiethnic" suburbs pay 65'X, higher tax rates than white suburbs); Ruth Hoogland DcHoog ct al., Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban
Gheuos, 13 J. URB. AFF. 479,486-90 (1991) (concluding that suburban blacks had worse
public scrvices when they lived in a majority black town as compared to a metropolitan
government in which they were a minority).
13. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at 154-55.
14. See John R. Logan, Separate and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks and
Hispanics in Metropolitan America, 5-6, 13-14, 19, Oct. 13, 2(XJ2, http://mumfordl.dyndns.
org!ccn2(XXJ/ScpUncq/SUReport!SURepPagd.htm (Lewis Mumford Center) (finding that
due to segregation, middle-class blacks and Hispanics arc kss able than whites to move
into middle-class neighborhoods, and so have less access than whites to the superior public services available in such neighborhoods); MARY PATTILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET
FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 28-30 (1999) (noting that proximity of black middle-class neighborhoods to poor neighborhoods means
that "residential n;turns to being middle class for blacks arc far smaller than for middleclass whites").
15. See GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002).
16. See Linda Krieger, The Colllelll of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995)
(surveying research on cognitive racial biases).
17. See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNNE M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR HJ6-20,
272-76 (1996) (arguing that modern antiblack prejudice is a form of subtle racial n:sent-
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Racial stigma, besides constituting a profound expressive
harm to blacks, has multiple deleterious material effects. It
causes subtle forms of unconscious employment discrimination. 20
It underlies discrimination in consumer markets. 21 It causes what
Glenn Loury calls "discrimination in contact" -pervasive tendencies of nonblacks to shun contact with blacks, or limit their
contact to formal, arms-length relationships. 22 This shunning is
manifested in such phenomena as white flight, low rates of intermarriage with blacks, the reluctance of nonblacks to adopt
black children, and the exclusion of blacks from informal networks of association and mentorship that are so critical to educational and career advancement. Racial stigma therebr impairs
the opportunities of blacks to develop their talents.- 3 It also
frames public discourse so as to characterize the disadvantages
of blacks as "their" problem rather than "ours," as manifestations of biological inferiority or cultural pathology rather than
externally imposed disadvantages. Such framings induce "racial
negligence" on the part of political institutions: systematic failures to investigate the often grossly disadvantageous impact of
public policies on blacks, and indifference to these impacts when
they come to light. 24 Blacks' awareness of the ways they are
stigmatized also causes material as well as psychological harm.
"Stereotype threat" -stressful responses to situations in which
blacks anticipate that their behavior might be judged as confirming a demeaning stereotype- impairs black performance on
standardized tests and thereby limits their educational opportumcnt); see also David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN
CONTROVERSY (Phylis Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988).
18. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Colltemporary

Prejudice:

The

Causes,

Consequences,

and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in

CONFRONTING RACISM 3, 3-8 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske cds., 1998)
(showing how those \\<ho profess adherence to colorblind principles treat blacks less favorably than whites when their behavior is not monitored); A.G. Greenwald, D.E
McGhee, & J.L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (documenting unconscious negative racial stereotypes in test subjects).
19. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999) (finding that news media portray blacks as
"'problem cases" for welfare out of proportion to their actual representation among such
cases).
20. See Krieger, supra note 16.
21. IAN AYERS, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 29-33, 68-78 (explaining documented discrimination
against blacks in retail car sales by stereotype-based statistical discrimination).
22. LOURY, supra note 15, at 95-99.
23. /d. at99-103.
24. /d. at 80-82 (citing American indifference to vast disparities in rates of imprisonment of blacks compared to other racial groups).
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nities. 25 There is also growing evidence that the psychological
stress of stigmatization and its attendant daily humiliationswhich affects middle class 26 as well as poor blacks- has deleterious effects on health. 27
Centuries of massive state and private racial discrimination
created the segregation and racial stigma that so gravely disadvantage blacks today. But once established, these mechanisms
are individually self-sustaining. De facto job segregation, by isolating blacks from the social networks that could lead them out,
begets more segregation. 28 Racial stereotypes cause stereotypereinforcing habits of perception: greater readiness to notice
stereotype-confirming than stereotype-defying features of
blacks, lesser readiness to notice heterogeneity within the black
population. 29 Moreover, racial stereotypes, when they induce
race-based differential treatment, can generate evidence that
seems to confirm the stereotype. If taxi drivers are reluctant to
pick up blacks for fear that they will be robbed, honest blacks
may be more likely than black robbers to give up trying to hail
taxis, leaving a pool of black taxi-hailers disproportionately
comRosed of robbers-hence confirming the taxi drivers' stereotype.Jo
Racial segregation and racial stigma are also mutually selfreinforcing. Stigma causes white flight, which causes residential
segregation. Job segregation introduces a racial element to managers' stereotypes about those most fit for the job, which causes
managers to hire people for the job whose race matches that of
the incumbents. 31 Thus, these mechanisms of systematic black
disadvantage survive long past the end of formal state discrimi25. Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the lntellectllal Test
Performance of African-Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).
26. See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (documenting personal experiences of discrimination suffered by middle-class blacks); Joe Feagin, The
Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. Soc.
REV. 101 (1991) (same).
27. See, e.g., Max Guyll, Karen A. Matthews, & Joyce T. Bromberger, Discrimina-

tion and Unfair Treatment: Relationship to Cardiovaswlar Reactivity Among African
American and European American Women, 20 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 315 (2001) (finding
that subtle race-based mistreatment raises the blood pressure of African American
women).
28. However, residential segregation could not persist without continuing housing
discrimination. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, 96-109.
29. Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29
CONTEMP. Soc. 319,321-22 (2000).
30. LOURY, mpra note 15, at 30-31.
31. BARBARA F. RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
EMPLOYMENT 35-36 (1998).
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nation and the waning of intentional, illegal private-sector discrimination. They "lock in" the effects of past purposeful state
and private discrimination, generate subtler forms of often unconscious and legal discrimination, and inflict myriad kinds of
direct damage to blacks that are unmediated by any form of discrimination.
II. RACIAL INTEGRATION AS A
REMEDY AND IDEAL
No controversial or sophisticated moral assumptions are
needed to recognize that the mechanisms of systematic racial
disadvantage described above are deeply unjust. Segregation and
racial stigma are the continuing effects of massive wrongdoing in
the past. Justice requires that one not only cease intending to
wrongfully injure others, but also dismantle any wrongfully established mechanisms that continue to do damage even in the
absence of a continuing intention to do so. This is not a matter of
reparations for past wrongs. The wrongs are still happening.
Even if current racial stigmatization and segregation were
not caused by past wrongdoing, they would still be unjust. Racial
stigmatization harms people on the basis of invidious stereotypes
and other pernicious cognitive biases. Racial segregation violates
even a weak principle of racial equality of opportunity, confined
to the idea that one's racial status should not figure in causal
mechanisms that put one at a profound disadvantage in access to
opportunities.
The real difficulty is not in judging that segregation and racial stigmatization are unjust, but in figuring out how to undo
them. Current antidiscrimination laws are insufficient because
much segregation and stigma are self-sustaining. Nor can such
laws be extended to cover discrimination in contact, because that
would violate individual rights to freedom of association in intimate relations. States have limited power to prevent white flight.
States do have the power to integrate their own institutions,
especially the public schools. If racial segregation is the problem,
then racial integration is a remedy. This remedy serves to correct
injustices within the state and to ameliorate segregation in the
wider world. The school-age and college years are a formative
period of life, during which people form friendships, acquaintances, and habits of association that persist through adulthood.
Students who have attended more racially integrated schools are
more likely to have racially diverse friends, co-workers, and
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neighbors than those who have attended racially homogeneous
schools. 32 Racial integration of schools is therefore a direct remedy for the isolation from social networks that is a prime cause
of black economic disadvantage, and an indirect spur to integration in other domains.
Racial integration is also a remedy for stigmatization. By integration, I mean the joint participation on terms of equality of
members of different racial groups in a social setting. According
to the "contact hypothesis," prejudice is reduced by sustained,
institutionally supported intergroup cooperation among equal
status individuals (i.e., peers or co-workers). 33 Cooperation toward a shared goal induces favoritism toward those in the cooperative group, which can override race-based biases. 34 When
people focus on achieving common goals with peers, they have
reasons to search for and use individuating information about
the cooperators, rather than relying on stereotypes. 35 The participation of more than token numbers of a stigmatized group in
the cooperative enterprise thereby helps break down stereotypes
and reduces discrimination against members of the group. 36 Racial integration in a cooperative setting also facilitates the formation of interracial friendships and associations that have a life
outside that setting. Even those who do not personally form such
relationships become more racially tolerant when they know
their friends have interracial friendships. 37
Integration is not only a remedy for injustice. It is also part
of the democratic ideal. Democracy is a system of collective selfgovernance among equal citizens, in which we work out, collectively and inclusively, our rules for living together in society. To
enjoy democratic legitimacy, the terms of interaction through
which we work out these rules must credibly claim to be rea32. J.H. Braddock & J.M. McPartland, The Social and Academic Consequences of
School Desegregalion, 4 EQUITY & CHOICE 5 (1988); J.H. Braddock, M.P. Dawkins & W.
Trent, Why Desegregale? The Effec/ of School Desegregmion on Adull Occupmional Desegregalion of African Americans, Whiles, and Hispanics, 31 INT'L J. CONTEMP. Soc. 273,
281 (1994 ).
33. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE Of PREJUDICE 261-281 (1954).
34. Reskin, supra note 29, at 324; see also SAML:EL L. GAERTNER, & JOHN F.
DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMOI'. INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL

(2<XXJ).
35.
36.

Reskin, supra note 29, at 324.
Paul R. Sackett et al., Tokenism in Performance Evalumion: The Effec/s of

Work Group Represell/alion on Male-Female and While-Black Differences in Performance Rmings, 761. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 263,265-66 (1991).
37. Stephen C. Wright, Arthur Aron, Tracy McLaughlin- Volpe, & Stacy A. Ropp,
The Ex/ended Comac/ Effecl.· Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice, 73 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73 (1997).
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sonably responsive to the legitimate concerns of all. To achieve
such responsiveness requires a robust civil society, in which people from different walks of life exchange their views about the
problems they face, their interests, values, conflicts, hopes and
fears. As Robert Post has argued, the "capacity to regard oneself
from the perspective of the other ... is the foundation of the
critical interaction necessary for active and effective citizenship. " 38 Given the realities of race in the U.S., people of different
races occupy different walks of life. So in the U.S., democracy
requires racial integration of the main institutions of civil society,
the places where discussions of public import among citizens
take place: public accommodations, workplaces, schools, and
neighborhoods.
The same point applies to society's elites, those who play a
pivotal role in formulating and adopting policies of public import. Elites, to be legitimate, must serve a representative function: they must be capable of and dedicated to representing the
concerns of people from all walks of life, so that the policies they
forge are responsive to these concerns. An elite drawn only from
segments of society that live in isolation from other segments
will be ignorant of the circumstances and concerns of those who
occupy other walks of life. Moreover, when people from certain
walks of life are not present to make claims, their interests and
concerns are liable to be neglected. An elite that does not include members drawn from all walks of life will therefore be ignorant, irresponsible, and lack democratic legitimacy. In societies where one's race places one in a different walk of life, and
where elites are not racially integrated, elites are liable to produce policies that are racially negligent. Democratic elites must
therefore be racially integrated, lest they lack the competence
39
and legitimacy to perform their representative function.
In societies divided by racial segregation and stigmatization,
competence in interracial interaction cannot be assumed. Stigmatization breeds racial contempt; segregation breeds racial ignorance, distrust, and discomfort. Educating citizens for democracy, and elites for their representative function, requires that

38. Robert Post, /mroduction: to Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 23 (Robert Post & Michael Ragin cds., 1998).
39. This argument docs not depend on the thought that only blacks can represent
blacks. Such a thought would be disastrous, since it would entail that the function of
white elites is to represent whites. Rather, elites as a whole arc charged with representing
the people as a whole. They cannot competently perform this function without being racially inclusive.
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such problems be overcome. This requires practice in social interaction on terms of equality with individuals of different races.
It therefore requires the actual participation on terms of equality
of people of different racial status in elite institutions. Racial integration of elite educational institutions is therefore, in the context of the ways race informs people's life circumstances and
identities in the U.S. today, an imperative of both justice and
democracy.
III. FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: DEVELOPING
THE INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE
I have argued that racial integration of civil society is a
morally and politically compelling interest. The same arguments
support the claim that it is a constitutionally compelling interest.
This is the conclusion of Grutter v. Bollinger, which develops the
integrationist ideal emerging from Brown v. Board of Educatton.
In tracing Grutter to Brown and not just Bakke,40 I emphasize its
expansive scope and broad justification, rooted in concerns of
social justice and democracy. The "diversity" defense of affirmative action, articulated in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, limits
integration to those cases in which it can be shown to yield educational benefits. Grutter advances a more robust integrationist
perspective, which affirms racial integration as a compelling interest apart from its educational benefits. It therefore returns to
the integrationist tradition of Brown and its successors, without
explicitly grounding itself in that tradition.
Let us first trace the development of the integrationist perspective in the desegregation cases. Brown found that- de facto
racial segregation was harmful to blacks, and that de jure segregation was stigmatizing. 41 These harms were the basis of the
Court's holding that "separate but equal" schools are "inherently unequal" 42 and hence a violation of Equal Protection.
However, Brown II did not even mention segregation, calling
only for the elimination of "discrimination" by the public
43
schools. It therefore left open the question of whether the
state's obligation was simply to end its own racial discrimination,
40. Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (l 978).
41. Brown V. Bd. or Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("Segregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races
is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.'')_
42. !d. at 495.
43. Brown v_ Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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or to actually dismantle se~regation. Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County 4 settled this question. It held that
school boards found to have practiced de jure segregation could
not fulfill their constitutional obligation simply by ending the
practice of assigning children to schools on the basis of race,
while handing off the job of maintaining segregation to the private choices of students and their parents. They had an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary [i.e. integrated] system." 45 The "constitutionally required end" is "the abolition of the system of segregation and its
effects." 46 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court held that this end could justify the assignment of
teachers and students to schools on the basis of their race. 47 It
thereby declared that the ideal of colorblindness is subordinate
to the equal protection demand to abolish segregation and its effects.
Some post-Brown desegregation cases also acknowledged
integration as a democratic ideal, and the special role schools
play in advancing this ideal. In Swann, the Court acknowledged
that, while courts lacked the authority to order schools to pursue
racial integration for its educational benefits,
[s]chool authorities are traditionally charged with broad
power to formulate and implement educational policy, and
might well conclude, for example, that, in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society, each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of
48
school authorities ....

In Keyes, Justice Powell, writing in partial concurrence, claimed
that

44. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
45. !d. at 437-38 (rejecting "freedom of choice" plan for assigning students to
schools).
46. /d. at440, quoting Bowman v. County School Board, 382 F.2d 326,333 (4th Cir.
1967) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
47. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. 1, 19,28 (1971)
(rejecting claim that the Constitution requires teachers to be assigned to schools on a
"color blind" basis, when de jure teacher assignments had enabled schools to be racially
identified; rejecting "racially neutral" student assignments when they "fail to counteract
the continuing effects of past school segregation" and requiring race-conscious "affirmative action" to achieve desegregation).
48. /d. at 16.
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In a pluralistic society such as ours, it is essential that no racial
minority feel demeaned or discriminated against and that students of all races learn to play, work, and cooperate with one
another in their common pursuits and endeavors. Nothing in
this opinion is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in promoting the
49
values of an integrated school experience.

This passage endorses both the antistigmatization and democratic education arguments for racial integration.
Justice Powell's views on school desegregation are particularly important because Powell devised the diversity defense of
affirmative action. In Keyes, Powell characterized the constitutional right found in Brown and its successors as an affirmative
right to racial integration:
I would now define it as the right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause, to expect that ... local school boards will
operate integrated school systems within their respective districts. This means that school authorities ... must make and
implement their customary decisions with a view toward en50
hancing integrated school opportunities.

Powell advanced this view in the context of an extended argument that the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation be abandoned. 51
Had the Court accepted Powell's view of the constitutional
irrelevance of the distinction between de fact and de jure segregation, Powell's case for affirmative action in higher education
could have been more straightforward. In Bakke, Powell could
have argued that, in practicing affirmative action in admissions,
colleges and universities are simply fulfilling their Constitutional
duty to "implement their customary decisions with a view toward enhancing integrated school opportunities." But since the
de jure/de facto distinction remained in force, and the Davis
Medical School had not been found to have violated the Constitutional prohibition on de jure segregation, it had no constitutional duty to integrate its student body. 52

49. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973)
50. !d. at 225-26.
51. !d. at 222-25.
52 Regents of the Umv ol CaL V. Bakke, 438 U.S 265, 3lXJ-01 (1978) (rcJectmg
the analogizing of Dav1s Med1cal School's alhrmallvc actiOn case to school desegregatiOn
cases because m the former, "there was no JUdiCial dctcrmmat10n of constitutional v1olation as a predicate for the formulation of a remedial classification").
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Powell held instead that colleges and universities have a
constitutional right, following from their First Amendment right
to academic freedom, to promote "a diverse student body. " 53 He
tied this compelling interest in "diversity" to the need to educate
an elite for national leadership. Observing the connection between diversity in the student body and opportunities of students
"to learn from their differences," 54 Powell concluded that "the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." 55 This diversity argument is congruent
with the integrationist argument that elites in a democratic society, in which racial ascriptions and identities place people in different walks of life, need to be educated in racially integrated
settings. In other words, "diversity" is another way of talking
about integration. This was understood at the time Bakke was
litigated. 56 Powell's diversity argument is continuous with his
claim in Keyes that schools have a compelling interest in "promoting the values of an integrated school experience."
When Powell sought to specify more concretely the educational benefits of diversity, he argued that people of different
races may bring perspectives that elites need to know if they are
to competently serve a diverse population:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise
qualified medical student with a particular backgroundwhether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of medicine
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its
student body and better equip its graduates to render with
57
understanding their vital service to humanity.

53. /d. at 311-12.
54. /d. at 312-13 n.48 (quoting William Bowen, then President of Princeton University).
55. /d. at 313.
56. Justice Brennan represented the Harvard admissions plan, which Powell cited
as an exemplar of "diversity," as aiming "to achieve an integrated student body." ld at
326 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Tobrincr of
the California Supreme Court, dissenting in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18
Cal. 3d 34 (1976), identified the defendant's purpose as "the attainment of a racially integrated, diverse medical school student body." /d. at 66. Tobriner connected the diversity
rationale to the integrationist aim of Brown, complaining of the "sad irony" that "the
first admission program aimed at promoting diversity ever to be struck down under the
Fourteenth Amendment is the program most consonant with the underlying purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment," one of which he just identified, in the previous sentence, as
"the promotion of integration." /d.
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
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This is an application of the integrationist argument that the nation's elite needs to be racially integrated if it is to avoid racial
negligence.
Although Powell's diversity argument shared some continuities with the integrationist perspective, it altered the path of
school integration in three key ways. First, "diversity" includes
race as but one factor among others. It follows that schools may
not, under the diversity defense, administer a preferential admissions system in which race is the only diversity factor considered.58 Second, Powell's diversity argument divorced educational
from social justice concerns. It follows that schools may seek racial diversity by means of racial preferences even if this is not
needed to undo the causes of racial injustice, so long as diversity
advances other educational goals. Third, Powell's argument excluded integrationist practices intended to advance racial justice
in ways that do not operate through the educational benefits of
diversity. Under the diversity defense, schools may seek integration to promote educational remedies for racial injustices-for
example, to break down racial stereotypes, make information
about the differential racial impact of policies salient, and promote competence in interracial engagement. But the diversity
defense does not support the use of race to effect noneducational remedies-for example, to remedy de facto segregation.
Powell's detachment of the diversity argument from explicit
concerns of racial justice had enormous cultural consequences.
His substitution of "diversity" for "integration" and its associated muting of concerns about racial justice set the stage for a
vast expansion of the perceived uses of "diversity." Diversityrelated programming exploded. Most importantly, "diversity"
escaped the confines of Powell's original educational rationale.
Other institutions, such as leading corporations, correctional institutions, and the military, began to practice "diversity." In
Powell's scheme, schools were uniquely entitled to use racial
preferences to promote diversity because they could cite another
constitutional right, their First Amendment right to academic
freedom, which justified the use of race. 59 Noneducational institutions offered other rationales for diversity- the need to stay
globally competitive, 60 to secure the obedience of black inmates
58. !d. at 314-15; Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798 (1st Cir.) (rejecting Boston
Latin School's admissions program for failure to consider nonracial diversity factors).
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
60. Brief of Amicus Curiae, General Motors Corp., Grutter v. Bollinger, 534 U.S.
306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516).
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in correctional "boot camps," 61 to enhance the effectiveness of
the military. 62
Thus, when the Supreme Court reconsidered the diversity
defense in Grutter, it packed a greater variety of claims into "diversity" than Powell ever imagined. On its surface, Grutter
merely reaffirmed Bakke in holding that affirmative action is justified to obtain "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body. "63 Yet, in arguing that the interest in these benefits is compelling, Grutter appealed to the interests of the wider
society. It allowed selective schools to piggyback their own diversity defense on the demand of other institutions, notably the
military and leading corporations, for a racially diverse, highly
educated elite to staff their positions. 64 Grutter also highlighted
racial integration as both an educational remedy for racial injustice and as an ideal in itself. Regarding integration as an educational remedy, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, accepted
the University of Michigan Law School's claims that a racially
diverse student body "promotes 'cross-racial understanding,'
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students]
to better understand persons of different races."' 65 Diversity
thereby "'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society. "' 66
O'Connor's most significant new focus, however, was on the
importance of racial integration over and above its educational
benefits. In part this reflects a concern with the legitimacy of the
elite:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society
must have confidence in the openness and inte~rity of the
6
educational institutions that provide this training.

6 I. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir.).
62. Consolidated Brief of Amicus Curiae, Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton et al., Gruttcr
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2!Xl3) (No. 02-241, 02-516).
63. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).
64. /d. at 33 I.
65. /d. at330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a).
66. /d. at 331 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae, American Educational Research Association ct al. 3). Strangely, O'Connor docs not cite Swann in support of the same
proposition.
67. /d. at 332.
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Integration of elite institutions is also necessary to ensure that
opportunities for success at the highest level are effectively open
to all racial groups:
Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must
be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in Amer.
68
1ca.

Most importantly of all, racial integration is an ideal in itself:
Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream
69
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.

These last three rationales depart from Powell's exclusive focus
on the educational benefits of diversity. They do not justify diversity as advancing educational goals at all. Rather, they affirm
the integrationist perspective that opened this paper. Notwithstanding its diversity rhetoric, Grutter expands upon the fullblooded integrationist ideal developed by Brown and its successors.
IV. THE VULNERABILITIES OF GRUTTER AND
THEIR SOLUTION IN BROWN
O'Connor's ostensible reliance on Powell's diversity rationale for affirmative action left her opinion vulnerable to two types
of objection raised by the dissenting justices in Grutter. The first
focuses on the ways the diversity defense licenses racial preferences for purposes unconnected to racial justice and democracy.
The second focuses on the failure of the diversity defense to
meet strict scrutiny. Both defects can be corrected by resituating
Grutter's defense of affirmative action in the integrationist tradition following Brown.
Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's holding in part
because "marginal improvements in legal education do not qualify as a compelling state interest. "70 If they did, then they could
equally well justify racial segregation. In support of this claim,
Thomas cited studies suggesting that black students learn less in
68.
69.
70.

!d. at 332-33.
!d. at 332.
/d. at 357.
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racially diverse settings than in all-black schools. 71 His point was
that goals unconnected to the pursuit of racial justice can easily
be turned against that pursuit. If white students' standardized
test scores were marginally improved in a racially homogeneous
setting, no one would accept that these educational benefits
would be sufficiently compelling to entitle a school to discriminate against minority applicants. This double-edged sword applies as well to the corporate use of "diversity" to enhance global
competitiveness. If corporations found that assigning only AsianAmerican employees to do business in Asia enhanced their
global competitiveness, no one would accept this as a justification for barring blacks and Hispanics from those assignments.
The diversity defense, whether limited to educational settings, as Justice Powell intended, or expanded in service of corporate goals, as Justice O'Connor allows, has no answer to the
double-edged sword. The integrationist defense, by contrast, can
exclude racial segregation as a permissible means toward educational and corporate goals. It limits compelling educational goals
to those that are specifically linked to remedying racial injustice-e.g., breaking down stereotypes-and promoting integration as a democratic ideal-e.g., teaching people to interact
competently across racial lines. It does not permit corporate
goals to be pursued at the expense of integration.
The second vulnerability of Grutter lies in its deference to
schools practicing affirmative action. 72 Dissenting Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas repeatedly complained
that Grutter's deference was unprecedented and incompatible
with strict scrutiny. 73 Had O'Connor situated her opinion in the
context of the school desegregation cases, she could have shown
that the dissent was mistaken. Deference to the greater expertise

71. !d. at 364. Thomas' suggestion that black beneficiaries of affirmative action
would he better off at Historically Black Colleges is belied by the best studies of this issue. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

61, 114-15, 143-45, 1'!9 (1998) (finding that blacks admitted to more selective schools
graduate and attain advanced degrees at higher rates, earn higher incomes, and report
higher satisfaction with their college experience than comparably qualified black students
at less selective schools). HBC's do an extraordinary job for their students, hut their programs arc mainly geared toward black students with substantially lower educational
preparation than the black students who attend selective schools, and so for the most
part cannot offer the latter the challenging curricula they need, and get, at selective
'chools.
72. Gmtter, 53'! U.S. at 328 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions.").
73. !d. at379-80, 386 (Rchnquist); at387, 3'!3 (Kennedy); at 350,361 (Thomas).
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of school authorities and to the value of local control have been
the constitutional norms in judging whether schools already
found guilty of practicing unconstitutional de jure segre~ation
are complying with Brown's requirement to desegregate. 4 Indeed, the dissenters in Grutter have repeatedly insisted on the
doctrine of deference to school authorities in desegregation
cases, even though their conduct is subject to strict scrutiny. 75
Although O'Connor's deferential approach was historically
consistent, it missed an opportunity to legitimize affirmative action by demonstrating that it can meet the demands of a more
rigorous and skeptical examination. Strict scrutiny of racial classifications demands that the use of race be narrowly tailored to
fit the state's compelling interest. The dissenters argued that the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy
failed narrow tailoring requirements in several areas: (1) in the
relative weight given to admission of each of the groups granted
preference; (2) in operating racial quotas that are indistinguishable from unconstitutional racial balancing; and (3) in the consideration of race-neutral alternatives. In each case, Grutter
could have met the narrow tailoring challenge had it appealed to
precedents set by the school desegregation cases.
(1) Relative weights given to members of preferred racial
groups. Justice Rehnquist observed that the University of Michigan Law School systematically preferred African-American applicants to Hispanic applicants with at least equal qualifications,
to the point where it had a "critical mass" of African-Americans
nearly twice the size of that for Hispanics. This preference is incompatible with the diversity defense, which holds that a "critical mass" of each disadvantage racial group may be pursued for
educational objectives only. 76 Shouldn't it take as many Hispanics to break down Hispanic stereotypes against them, as it takes
African-Americans to break down stereotypes about blacks?
The diversity defense, because it ties the significance of race to
its educational effects, has no answer to Rehnquist's objection.
74. See Wendy Parker, What School Desegregation Teaches Affirmative Action,
Wake Forest Puhlic Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No.
03·13, Aug., 2003, http://ssrn.com/ahstract=439141.
75. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (majority opinion hy Rehnquist,
joined by Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 48990 (1 992) (majority opinion hy Kennedy, joined hy Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Souter)
(Justice Thomas took no part in the case); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991) (majority opinion hy Rehnquist, joined by Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
White). See generally Parker, supra note 74.
76. Bakke, 539 U.S. at 381.
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Suppose instead that we based Grutter on an integrationist
defense of affirmative action. Then the groups to be included in
affirmative action preferences are those groups who currently
suffer systematic disadvantage due to substantial de facto segregation from the mainstream. African-Americans, Hispanics, and
Native Americans fit this criterion. The objective of affirmative
action is to remedy this segregation and its effects. The weight
given to this objective for each group is tied to the urgency of
each group's need for integration-that is, the degree of severity
of the segregation they suffer. African-Americans are the most
extremely segregated racial group in the U.S.; Hispanics are
next. 77 This justifies the greater weight the Law School gave to
African-American over Hispanic admissions.
(2) Quotas and racial balancing. Rehnquist and Kennedy
charged that the tight correlation between the percentage of
each minority group in the applicant pool and the percentage of
total offers granted to each minority group shows that the Law
School was engaged in unconstitutional racial balancing. 78 This
complaint confuses ends with means. Racial balancing cannot be
a legitimate end in itself, because it amounts to racial discrimination for its own sake. 79 But the school desegregation cases do accept racial balancing as a means to other goals, including dismantling segregation and promoting democratic ideals of living
together in a pluralistic society. 80 It is impossible to tell, simply
by looking at admissions figures, whether a school is actually
seeking racial balance, 81 and if so, whether this is an end in itself
or a means to another goal. One must examine what the school
does with the diversity it achieves in the student body to assess
77. See Lewis Mumford Center. supra note 6, al 1 (reporting !hal at currenllrends
of black integration, il would "lake forty more years for black-while segregation lo come
down even to the current level of Hispanic-while segregation").
78. Bakke, 539 U.S. 306,383 (Rehnquisl), 2371 (Kennedy).
79. ld. at 307.
80. Swann v. Charlolle-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S., 16, 28. The First Circuit Court of Appcals rejected racial balancing as a permissible means toward diversity,
abscnl a showing !hal racial proportional rcprcsenlalion was nceded for specifically educational goals. Wessman v. Gillens, 160 F.3d 790, 797-98 (lsl Cir. 1998). However, as a
means toward desegregation, il remains constitutional. I argue below, part V, that claims
lothc contrary arc bascd on a confusion between the powers of Federal Courts and other
slate bodies to implcmcnl remedies for segregation.
81. Kennedy's inference is unwarranted because it ignores the dynamic effects of a
school's admissions policies on its pool of applicants. Suppose applicants from each racial
group have roughly similar risk aversion-that is, suppose the mcdian threshold probability of rejection, above which they would not apply to an institution, is the same for
each racial group. Then the percentage of students from each racial group in the pool of
admillcd students will mirror their proportion in the applicant pool, regardless of a
school's admissions goals.
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its objective. If it fails to use that diversity to spur interracial discussion and cooperation then the inference that the school is operating an unconstitutional racial spoils system may be correct.
But if it promotes actual integration-i.e., interracial cooperation and dialogue- then it is using racial balancing as a tool, not
as an end in its self.
(3) Race-neutral alternatives. It is not impossible to racially
integrate a law school, or any other school, using race-neutral alternatives. What is impossible under current conditions is doing
so, consistent with a selective admissions system. Thus, to defend
its system of racial preferences in admissions, the University of
Michigan Law School had to argue that it had a compelling interest in two goals: racial diversity and selectivity. Justice Thomas argued that having a law school at all, much less an elite law
school, cannot be a compelling interest. 82 Therefore, if it wants
racial diversity, it should sacrifice selectivity.
Thomas' argument that states have no compelling interest in
having law schools is unpersuasive. States have a compelling interest in fulfilling their constitutional functions, and thus in any
conditions instrumentally necessary to fulfilling their functions.
Among these functions is the administration of the laws. One
cannot administer laws without trained lawyers, and hence not
without law schools. By contrast, Thomas' argument that the
University of Michigan Law School's desire to maintain its elite
status does not constitute a compelling interest is correct. 83 The
desire of a school to maintain an elite reputation cannot justify
racial discrimination. If it could, then if its elite reputation rested
on its racial homogeneity, it could assert a compelling interest in
discriminating against racial minorities. This is another instance
of the double-edged sword.
Against this, defenders of diversity can justly complain that
it is unfair to characterize the interest at stake in Grutter as
merely reputational. The state's compelling interest is in having
an elite educated to the highest standards. When a school softens
its admissions standards across-the-board to achieve diversity, it
will end up admitting a student body that is, by and large, not
prepared for the most advanced courses. It will therefore need to
shift resources toward less challenging courses, at the cost of advanced courses. Hence, to promote learning at the most advanced levels, educational systems need selective schools. This
82.
83.

Cruller, 539 U.S. at 358-59.
/d. at 360.
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reply does not fully meet Thomas' objection, however. Insofar as
diversity is held to be compelling only as an educational interest,
why must the same schools that specialize in diversity education
also specialize in the most advanced education? Even if the state
educational system as a whole has compelling interests in both, it
does not follow that each school taken individually does.
To answer this objection, we must look beyond the purely
educational goods at stake-and hence beyond the diversity defense-to the wider, noneducational, democratic purposes
served by elite education. The integrationist defense identifies
these purposes as having an elite that is legitimate, representative, and competent to serve the interests of citizens from all
walks of life. To advance these compelling interests, the elite must
not only be racially integrated; its diverse members must be educated together. 84 Only so can they develop competence in interracial interaction. Only so can they develop a shared responsiveness to the interests of citizens from all walks of life. So long as
responsiveness to the interests of different racial groups is divided among elites according to their race, rather than taken up
as a shared responsibility, this Nation will continue to be divided
into de facto racial blocs. "The dream of one Nation, indivisible"
therefore requires that the same institutions that provide advanced education to elites also practice racial integration. This
dream is not reducible to "diversity" conceived as an instrument
for advancing purely educational goals. It is the full-blooded integrationist ideal itself, extended to civil society as a whole.
Justice Thomas suggested that even if these points were
conceded, it is still ROssible to integrate selective schools using
race-neutral criteria. 85 Even if we ignore the dramatic drops in
the enrollment of blacks entailed by using ostensibly "raceneutral" criteria of admission, 86 Thomas' claim is still questionable. Facially race-neutral admissions criteria have succeeded
even this much only because they have been selected for their
84. Cf. Sam Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
669, 682 (1998) (arguing that race-conscious admissions is the only way universities can
pursue their dual mission of achieving national excellence and integrating all groups into
the nation's elite).
85. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 361.
86. Thomas noted a 30% drop in black students at Boalt Hall after the passage of a
referendum banning affirmative action in California. ld. at 366-67. The University of
Texas Law School suffered a 64% drop in black students from 1997-2001, due to the ban
on affirmative action imposed by Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). Brief of
Amicus Curiae, American Educational Research Association ct al., Gruttcr v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-228).
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racially differential impact. But the distinction between using an
overt racial classification for its differential racial impact, and using a proxy for race to achieve the same impact, is a distinction
without a difference. Thomas acknowledged as much in condemning Columbia University's use of race-neutral intelligence
tests to reduce the number of Jews it admitted. 87 The same point
works in reverse. If it is acceptable to select race-neutral criteria
to increase the representation of disadvantaged racial groups in
the student body, it is acceptable to aim at this goal directly, using racial classifications. 88 Racial means are inherently the most
narrowly tailored means available to achieve this goal.
V. GRUTTER AS THE CULMINATION OF BROWN
I have argued that Grutter is more effectively defended by
appeal to Brown and its successor cases than by appeal to Bakke
alone. Grutter also represents the culmination of an integrationist perspective whose development was cut short in later successor cases to Brown. Against the claim that Gruffer develops the
principle of Brown, it might be thought that Brown and its successors are limited to the claim that the state has a compelling
interest in remedying de jure segregation. By contrast, Grutter
affirms that the state has a compelling interest in remedying de
facto segregation, and in pursuing integration as a democratic
ideal. Since it is assumed that de jure segregation is largely consigned to the past, Brown and its successors might be thought to
be irrelevant to Grutter.
However, the supposed gap between de jure and de facto
segregation is smaller than it appears. When a state has violated
equal protection, the Constitution demands not just that the violations cease, but that the effects of past violations be eliminated.89 Furthermore, states have a compelling interest in avoid87. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 369 ("Columbia employed intelligence tests precisely because Jewish applicants, who were predominantly immigrants, scored worse on such
tests. Thus, Columbia could claim (falsely) that '"we have not eliminated boys because
they were Jews and do not propose to do so."').
88. Kathleen Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1054. Some
may still have the nagging feeling that the usc of explicit racial preferences to achieve a
permissible race-conscious goal is objectionable. I argue that this feeling is groundless in
Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrwiny, 77 NYU L. REV. 1195, 1231-37, 126670 (2002). See also LOURY, supra note 15 at 133-41, 148-54, for different arguments toward a similar conclusion.
89. Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) (The "constitutionally required end" is "the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects.")
(emphasis added). Cf Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
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ing "passive participation" in private racial discrimination. 90 De
facto school segregation is both a continuing effect of past de
jure segregation, and reflects the transmission of private racial
discrimination into its own institutions. Schools therefore have a
compelling interest in remedying it.
The Supreme Court recognized this point in early desegregation cases. Green held that schools guilty of de jure segregation
had not fulfilled their duties by ceasing their own racial discrimination, if their schools remained de facto segregated due to their
transmission of individually legal but racially discriminatory
choices of students and their parents. 91 Swann held that schools
are constitutionally responsible not only for undoing the direct
segregative effects of their own discrimination, but for the indirect effects their segregative actions have on private housing
choices. 92 Similarly, in Keyes, the Court held Denver responsible
for desegregating its entire school system, even though proof of
segregative intent was shown only for a small portion of its
schools. This was in part because segregation of one part of the
district's schools indirectly influenced the racial composition of
the other schools by encouraging segregated patterns of residen93
tial development that further segregated neighborhood schools.
Justices Douglas and Powell, writing separately in Keyes,
carried this reasoning about the substantive interests of Equal
Protection to its logical limits. They argued that the distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation should be abandoned.
Douglas stressed that what matters, constitutionally, is not
whether the state had a formal intent to segregate, but simply
whether state action caused patterns of school segregation that
94
could have been avoided had "affirmative action" been taken.
A constitutional violation occurs whether school segregation is

ring) (acknowledging "compelling governmental interest in redressing the effects of past
discrimination") (emphasis added).
90. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) (arguing that a city may usc
race to allocate contracts to avoid passive participation in discrimination by local construction industry).
91. Green, 391 U.S. at440-41.
92. Swann v. Charlottc-Mccklcnbcrg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 21 (observing that
school districts often "promote segregated residential patterns" in their choices of where
to close and open schools).
93. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189,201-02. Keyes pointedly declined to rule
on the merits of the lower court's determination that even when courts could nul order
desegregation in cases of mere de facto segregation, the Constitution nevertheless required that school districts operate integrated schools even when the segregation is only
de facto.ld. at 214 n.l8, citing 313 F. Supp. 73, 96.
94. /d. at 214.
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due to the intentional policy of the school district, or its passive
transmission of the effects of the segregative policies of other
agents- for example, racially restrictive covenants, or "racial
ghettos" built with public funds by urban development authorities.95 Justice Powell extended this definition of state action to
include state acquiescence in the impact of private housing
choices on the racial composition of schools. Swann already required school districts convicted of de jure segregation to remedy
not merely that portion of segregation traceable to its intentional
segregation, but segregation due to private housing choices that
it had encouraged or facilitated. It would be constitutionally inconsistent to refuse to extend this latter requirement to school
districts that had not also been convicted of segregative intent,
although they facilitated private racial discrimination (white
flight) or transmitted its effects. 96 To vindicate each student's constitutional right to education in an integrated setting, 97 "school
boards have a duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. " 98
The Court declined to follow Powell's and Douglas' opinions. But its reasons for doing so were based on reservations
about the scope of judicial powers of enforcement, not on views
about the constitutional interests of other state bodies in remedying segregation. In Milliken, the Court overturned a judicially
imposed interdistrict remedy for Detroit's de jure segregation, in
part because it would make the District Court "a de facto 'legislative authority' ... and then the 'school superintendent' for the
99
entire area. " The courts lacked the competence to administer
school districts to the extent required to effect the proposed
remedy. They also lacked the legitimacy to do so, given that such
administration would require them to make political decisions
(concerning, for example, the allocation of local tax dollars
across city boundaries) traditionally held to be the proper province of elected officials. Local control of education is a para-

95. /d. at 216 ("When a State forces, aids, or abets, or helps create a racial
"neighborhood," it is a travesty of justice to treat that neighborhood as ... free from the
taint of state action.")
96. /d. at 227 (''Public schools arc creatures of the State, and whether the segregation is statc-crcalL:d or state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to
constitutional principle.").
97. /d.
98. /d. at 236
99. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974) ("This is a task which few, if
any, judges arc qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of control
of schools through their elected representatives").
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mount consideration that limits the degree to which courts will
find school districts responsible for equal protection violations.
The same concern for local control pervades Board of Education v. Dowell. 100 In Dowell, the Court permitted a desegregation decree to be dissolved and a locally designed student reassignment plan to be adopted, even if this immediately led to the
de facto resegregation of schools, provided that the school district had proved its good faith by complying with the original decree for enough time, and it had eliminated "the vestiges of past
discrimination" "to the extent practicable." 101 It reasoned that
the federal system allocated to Courts only a temporary power
to issue injunctions requiring desegregation. "Local control over
the education of children allows citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can
fit local needs." 102 Hence,
Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local authorities
have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of
time properly recognizes that "necessary concern for the important values of local control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's regulatory control of such systems
not extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of
past intentional discrimination." See [Milliken II], 433 U.S. at
280-82.

103

On its face, Dowell proposed two distinct criteria for when a desegregation decree should be dissolved: when the local school
district has complied with it "for a reasonable period of time"
and when it has actually remedied "the effects of past intentional
discrimination." The substantive Equal Protection norm is, of
course, the latter. However, as Justice Scalia argued in Freeman
v. Pitts, the extent of judicial enforcement of this norm is determined almost entirely by the Court's presumptions about the
causal connections between prior de jure and current de facto
segregation. 104 Dowell and Freeman shift the presumption toward school boards, in the interest of protecting the Tenth
Amendment powers of the states, as delegated to the local
boards. This means that Courts must presume that, once the
state has complied with desegregation orders for a period of
time, demographic shifts during that period should not be attrib100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

498 u.s. 237.
/d. at250.
/d. at248.
/d.
503 u.s. 467,503.
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uted to prior state action even when they exacerbate de facto
segregation, and even when they are caused by racially motivated blockbusting and white flight. 105 As Freeman stressed, "the
ultimate objective has not chan~ed- to return school districts to
the control of local authorities." 06 For this reason, Courts should
hold school boards accountable only when their action is the
.
. 107
proxtmate
cause o f d e f acto segregatwn.
These are doctrines about the burdens of proof, not about
substantive equal protection norms. They are justified by institutional considerations about the limits of judicial power vis a vis
other state bodies. It follows that they cannot be invoked to limit
108
the power of other state bodies to remedy segregation. To the
contrary, their whole point is to expand the power of schools and
other state bodies to use their discretion in running the schools,
including their discretion in assigning students to schools. For
example, in Milliken, no constitutional principle would have rrevented the state of Michigan from consolidating the 54 school
districts in the Detroit metropolitan area into a single district.
The consolidated district would then have been free to implement a comprehensive desegregation plan including all of the
I 05. !d. at 480 (observing the de facto segregation of De Kalb County School System was
caused in part by blockbusting); /d. at 506 (Scalia, concurring, noting role of white !light).
106. !d. at 490 ("Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest
practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental system. When the school district and all state entities participating with it in operating the
schools make decisions in the absence of judicial supervision, they can be held accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary course.").
I 07. /d. at 491. Scalia also argued that after such a lapse of time, it is unreasonable to
suppose that there is any significant causal connection between past de jure segregation
and present de facto segregation. /d. at 506. This is erroneous. Current patterns of extreme black segregation could not exist in the absence of the segregation earlier achieved
through massive federal, state, and municipal action. For, given blacks' current preference to live in integrated neighborhoods, white !light alone could not succeed in creating
observed patterns of overwhelmingly white neighborhoods, unless some such neighborhoods had already been created through prior action, and maintained through continuing
discrimination. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 6, at 96-97. Moreover, prior state
action has actively promoted black stigmatization and antiblack prejudice in society at
large, and therefore is causally responsible for white llight.
I 08. This is an application of Lawrence Sager's famous argument that some constitutional norms arc systematically undcrcnforccd by the courts due to institutional concerns,
such as federalism, or the courts' lack of competence and legitimacy in domains traditionally managed by the other branches of government. In such cases, Sager argued, the
constitutional norms arc "legally valid to their full conceptual limits," although the responsibility for enforcing them to those limits must lie with other state bodies. Lawrence
Sager, Fair Measure: the Legal Status of Underenforced Constitwiona/ Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978). On the view argued here, any state body has a compelling interest, on grounds of equal protection, in remedying de facto segregation in which any
state actiOn played a causal role, even if that role is too indirect to entitle a Federal Court
to order it to act.
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schools within its borders, as a remedy for the illegal segregation
found in Detroit's schools.
In other rulings, the Court has recognized the distinction between the powers of Federal Courts and of other state bodies to
promote integration. In Bustop v. Board of Education, students
who were to be bused pursuant to a massive desegregation remedy ordered by state court under California's equal protection
clause asked the Supreme Court to issue a stay, on the ground
that individuals have a "federal right" to be "free from racial
quotas." 109 Justice Rehnquist refused to do so, arguing that California's status as a distinct sovereign entity entitled it to enforce
stronger equal protection norms in desegregation cases, under its
own state constitution, than Federal courts can require. 110 The
Court has also held that the Federal equal protection clause forbids states from barring local governments from using busing to
remedy mere de facto segregation.'''
Grutter represents the culmination of this line of thought.
The first successor cases to Brown articulate the substantive
Equal Protection norm: that states that have ever practiced segregation (which, as Keyes observed, means all states) must remedy its effects and avoid passive participation in the racially discriminatory choices of private parties, even when these choices
are legal. The desegregation cases from Milliken on limit the
scope of judicial powers to enforce this norm, in the interest of
respecting the autonomy of other state bodies to formulate their
own educational policies. Grutter holds that this autonomy includes the power to use racial means to integrate the institutions
of civil society-whether to remedy the de facto segregation that
would otherwise occur (as an effect of past de jure segregation or
private discrimination) or as a means to promote equal opportunity and democratic ideals. As Grutter affirms, "Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic
life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized." 112
109. 439 u.s. 1380, 1382 (1978).
110. !d. at 1383 ("While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of California
was required by the United States Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this
case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action").
111. Washington v. Seattle School District No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down
a state initiative forbidding local governments from implementing school busing for purposes of racial integration). Cf Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (striking
down New York law forbidding appointed school boards from using race-based student
assignments to remedy de facto segregation).
112. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at332.

